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The Second Intifada:
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by
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INTRODUCTION
What caused the outbreak of the second intifada? The conventional wis-
dom places the blame on one of two central figures, Ariel Sharon or Yasser
Arafat. In one version, Sharon, then the leader of the Israeli opposition, started
the intifada by going on an intentionally provocative visit to the Temple Mount
on 28 September 2000. Alternatively, Arafat, President of the Palestinian
Authority (PA), decided that the new State of Palestine should be launched in
blood and fire; he unleashed Palestinian militants rather than accept a negotiated
resolution of the conflict.
Both of these claims overplay the role of individual leaders and overlook
a wider array of elite decisions and deeper political and social conditions.
Decisions by Sharon and Arafat did matter, but not in the way that is conven-
tionally portrayed. Instead, a chain of events starting in 1993 set the stage for
renewed conflict. 
First, popular Palestinian discontent grew during the Oslo peace process
because the reality on the ground did not match the expectations created by the
peace agreements. From 1993-2000, many aspects of the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip deepened rather than abated. Palestinians expect-
ed their lives to improve in terms of freedom of movement and socioeconomic
standing; when both worsened, significant resentment built up in Palestinian
society. This discontent, further fed by the failure of the Camp David summit in
July 2000, laid the groundwork for popular support for a more confrontational
approach with Israel.
Second, organizations on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides prepared for
violence, in part because the other party was using or preparing for violence. On
the Palestinian side, younger militants also believed that the ability to respond
with force would improve any negotiated outcome by highlighting for the
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Israelis what would happen if they were not sufficiently forthcoming at the nego-
tiating table. When the confrontations started, Israeli and Palestinian organiza-
tions followed their game plans, exacerbating and escalating the violence. 
Third, Sharon and Arafat helped shift the status quo from a tense situation
to a violent one. Sharon’s visit was the spark that set the second intifada into
motion; it was a match in a dry forest and should be viewed historically among
a long line of individual events that served as triggers for major confrontations.
Arafat did not launch the intifada, but he and some other Palestinian leaders
decided not to try to rein in the violence once it started. Once the intifada began,
Arafat incorrectly assumed that he could use the violence to improve the
Palestinian position.
This multi-factor explanation for the outbreak of the intifada sheds light on
several theoretical debates. First, rather than assuming that the uprising resulted
from unmet expectations or political opportunities alone, this article highlights
factors from both schools of thought. Second, both the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) and some Palestinian factions thought the threat of violence would deter
the other side, but instead strong positions fed spirals of insecurity and escala-
tion. This escalatory impact of firm policies was exacerbated because Israel
assumed that external motivations rather than domestic ones explained growing
Palestinian militarization and because Palestinian militants assumed that force or
the threat of force could be used to advance diplomatic negotiations.
In the first section of the article, I critique existing explanations for the
intifada that blame Arafat and Sharon for the violent outbreak. In section two, I
present an important element of a more compelling explanation by discussing the
manner and impact of continued Israeli occupation. In section three, I highlight
Israeli and Palestinian military preparations that fed a conflict spiral. This is fol-
lowed by a section on the failed summit at Camp David in July 2000. Section
five details how Israeli and Palestinian responses during the early protests led to
escalation, not calm. I offer closing thoughts in section six.
The Conventional Wisdom
Two of the common explanations for the outbreak of the second intifada
revolve around individuals, Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, but neither explana-
tion fully captures the pathway to violence. Both ascribe too much intentionali-
ty to the actions of these two leaders and miss other important factors. Many
Israelis, including former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, contend that Arafat and
the Palestinians planned and executed a violent uprising because they wanted to
destroy Israel and win a Palestinian state through violent means. Many
Palestinians claim that Sharon went to the Temple Mount on 28 September with
the intention of provoking Palestinians and ending Israeli-Palestinian political
negotiations.
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Such actions are not a priori unthinkable. Just because a movement is, at
one point, committed to a peace process does not mean that at a later point it
might not see an advantage to turning to violence for a short or long period. Or,
just because the leadership of a state is pursuing a diplomatic route does not
mean that its domestic opponents or some other domestic actor might not seek to
cause unrest and thereby undermine the political talks.1 The evidence in each
case, however, does not support these deductive possibilities.
Arafat 
Arafat and the Palestinian leadership wanted an outbreak of violence.2 The
Palestinians did not get what they wanted at Camp David, and they believed vio-
lence would pressure Israel into further concessions. Another variant of this
explanation is that being seen as the leader of a new intifada would rescue Arafat
from being viewed as an obstacle to peace in the wake of the failed summit at
Camp David in July 2000. In any case, it would be better and more heroic if the
Palestinian state were born through violence. This explanation for the intifada is
coupled with a second idea: that the violent outbreak would serve as a platform
for the unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. The Israeli government
pushed the idea of pre-meditated Palestinian violence in its public relations
efforts.3
The view that Arafat and the Palestinian Authority orchestrated the out-
break of the initfada was rejected by the Mitchell committee, the investigative
body set up by the United States and others in late 2000.4 In an especially insight-
ful analysis of Palestinian decision-making, the academic Yezid Sayigh suggest-
ed Arafat’s approach was the exact opposite: “Contrary to the Israeli account,
[Arafat’s] behaviour since the start of the intifada has reflected not the existence
of a prior strategy based on the use of force, but the absence of any strategy.”5
Ami Ayalon, former head of Israel’s Shin Bet (General Security Service), was
clear: “Yasser Arafat neither prepared nor triggered the Intifada.”6 Menachem
Klein, an Israeli academic, agreed: “[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that there
was any such pre-planned decision by the Palestinian Authority.”7 Much of the
evidence often cited for a PA-led uprising was misconstrued, as I explain in dis-
cussing Palestinian and Israeli military preparations in section three below.
The PA twice tried to avoid provocations in September 2000, something
that is inconsistent with the search for a pretext for violence. First, it let pass the
perfect opportunity for launching an intifada, the 13 September date when
Palestinian leaders considered but decided against unilaterally declaring
Palestinian statehood. Despite repeatedly threatening to declare independence,
the PA consistently backed off from such threats and let “sacred dates” slide.8
This also reflects a quiet year until the intifada: in the first nine months of 2000,
one Israeli died from Palestinian terrorism.9
The PA’s unwillingness to pursue a unilateral route to statehood suggests
The Journal of Conflict Studies
117
that it was aware that a unilateral declaration was more likely than not to back-
fire. It would have given Israel license to act unilaterally as well. Barak, and
Benjamin Netanyahu before him, had stated that he would annex certain covet-
ed areas in response to a unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence.10
Given the imbalance in power between the two sides, Israel would very likely
emerge in a better position than the Palestinians in a battle of unilateral steps. In
short, the pathway to Palestinian statehood associated with violence was unlike-
ly to bring the Palestinians anything close to a state defined by the 4 June 1967
lines.
In the second instance, Palestinians repeatedly asked Israel and the United
States to block Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary. This again
suggests they did not want a pretext for a violent outbreak. Saeb Erekat, a
Palestinian negotiator, said he warned Shlomo Ben-Ami, then Israel’s acting for-
eign minister, in the presence of Dennis Ross, the top US negotiator.11 Ross has
since stated that Erekat told him of Sharon’s impending visit which led Ross to
speak to Ben-Ami. Ross says Ben-Ami told him (Ross) that Israeli law prevent-
ed the Israeli government from blocking Sharon’s visit.12 Arafat said he warned
Barak that Sharon’s impending visit might cause unrest, but Barak later denied
that Arafat had ever warned him.13 According to the Mitchell Report,
“Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohib-
it the visit.”14 PLC Speaker Ahmed Qurei opposed the visit: “The timing is not
suitable . . ..  It will provoke problems.”15 Faisal Husseini, the late Palestinian
representative in East Jerusalem, phoned an Israeli negotiator, Yisrael Hasson,
and warned against the visit fearing it would ignite the territories. “The warning
was relayed to the most senior echelons.”16 Leaders of the Islamic Movement
“adamantly oppose the idea of Sharon visiting the holy site and have asked Barak
to stop Sharon from carrying out his ‘provocative’ plan.”17 Ben-Ami claimed
Jibril Rajoub, a top Palestinian security official on the West Bank, approved the
visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary as long as Sharon did not enter the
two mosques. Rajoub denied this version. Rajoub’s position is backed up by
comments he made to the Jerusalem Post on the eve of Sharon’s visit: “The visit
is a provocation which will trigger bloodshed and confrontation . . . Sharon is
putting oil on fire.” He added: “If Sharon tries to enter the Haram a-Sharif, the
Moslems will stop him.”18 In short, “Many among the Palestinian leadership
sought the assistance of their Israeli counterparts to prevent Sharon’s visit. They
were turned down.”19
Even after the violence broke out, Israel and the PA continued to negotiate
suggesting that neither side had abandoned the diplomatic route. During
December 2000 and January 2001, the two parties engaged in high-level, com-
prehensive talks to try to resolve remaining differences. They dealt with sub-
stantive issues and considered further concessions.20 This casts doubt on the
claim that the Palestinians had abandoned talks for a violent path. Sections two
through four outline an alternative and more compelling explanation.
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Sharon 
On 28 September, Ariel Sharon, along with over 1,000 Israeli police offi-
cers, entered the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary. Some have blamed Sharon for
the ensuing violence.21 Sharon likely had two inter-related motives for visiting
the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary.  First, by demonstrating his commitment to
Israeli access to the site, he may have sought to gain an edge in his internal polit-
ical party battle with Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu, the then recently redeemed
former Israeli prime minister. Netanyahu was cleared in a political scandal on 27
September.22 Although Netanyahu had been soundly defeated by Barak in 1999,
he had experienced an “amazing revival in his public standing” by the summer
of 2000. Polls indicated he could now beat Barak in a new election for prime
minister.23 However, Netanyahu also would have had to move Sharon aside to re-
take control of the Likud opposition. Sharon’s visit, then, could have been an
effort to block Netanyahu’s political comeback.24
Given the Israeli-Palestinian talks going on at the time and the imminence
of high-level talks on the matter, Sharon also may have hoped to scuttle Barak’s
post-Camp David attempts to find a compromise on the future status of
Jerusalem. Likud spokesman Ofir Akounis called Sharon’s visit “a political state-
ment to show that under the Likud the Temple Mount would remain under Israeli
sovereignty.”25 Sharon could either assert the right of Israelis to visit the Temple
Mount or, if turned away, demonstrate that Barak had already effectively handed
over the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary to the Palestinians.26 Either way, his
image among right-wing Israelis would be strengthened.
While critical of the visit, the Mitchell committee rejected the idea that it
alone caused the intifada: “The Sharon visit did not cause the ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada.’
But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen;
indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.”27 The
cause of the intifada is more complex and begins with deeper structural factors
like the continuing Israeli occupation during the Oslo years.
Occupation
The continuing Israeli occupation, even after the Oslo agreements, was the
underlying cause of the second intifada. Palestinians had thought that the 1993
Oslo agreement would lead to better lives, greater freedoms, the end of Israeli
control, and, at the end of five years (1998), Palestinian statehood. Oslo was
thought to mean the end of Israeli occupation and the start of Palestinian self-
determination. When such changes failed to materialize and, in many ways, the
situation on the ground worsened in the mid and late 1990s, many Palestinians
started to believe that the diplomatic process was a dead end and renewed con-
frontation was the only alternative. This dynamic explains much of the popular
support for the second intifada.
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The importance of the Israeli occupation in understanding the outbreak of
the second intifada plays into a larger debate about the causes of revolts or upris-
ings. Ted Gurr noted that civil strife is often the result of a gap between what
individuals believe they are entitled to and what they actually get. This “relative
deprivation” leads to discontent and anger, “and that anger is a motivating state
for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response.”28 Thus, the deepening
of the Israeli occupation during the Oslo years had a volatile impact given the ris-
ing Palestinian expectations.
Other scholars, in contrast, have downplayed Gurr-like grievances and
suggest that the key factors that explain civil strife are those that affect the oppor-
tunity to rise up. James Fearon and David Laitin explain: “[our finding] provides
strong support for the big message that comes through in our country/year analy-
sis (Fearon and Laitin, forthcoming), namely that the conditions allowing for
successful insurgency is a better guide to its occurrence than are the social, eco-
nomic, political and cultural conditions that might motivate a group to organize
rebellion.”29 Conditions allowing for successful insurgency might include geo-
graphic factors or the residential concentration of particular groups.
The next three sections of this article draw from both theoretical camps.
While the emphasis in this section on occupation highlights Palestinian griev-
ances and dashed expectations, the followings sections on military preparations
and the failure of the Camp David summit (2000) are more directed at the
resources, organizational capabilities, and policy opportunities for both parties.
This case study of the second intifada, then, argues for a synthetic approach in
which multiple factors are needed to explain the outbreak of violence. 
Sumit Ganguly’s analysis of the Kashmir insurgency offered a related
understanding of uprisings. Ganguly, drawing on Samuel Huntingon’s Political
Order in Changing Societies, noted the central relationship between a political
system’s ability to allow for the expression of political demands and the outbreak
of violence: “The failure of governments to accommodate rising political
demands within an institutional context can culminate in political violence.”30
Whatever the source of “heightened political awareness” that leads to greater
political demands, people will turn to violence if they lack avenues through
which to channel those demands.31 In the rest of this section, I demonstrate how
the occupation worsened during the Oslo years and what this meant to
Palestinians.
As originally conceived in the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP or
Oslo I), the Oslo process included an interim phase of up to five years.32 By the
end of the third year, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were supposed to begin
permanent (or final) status talks on what were expected to be the most difficult
issues: “Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, rela-
tions and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common inter-
est.” Although it was not mentioned explicitly at the time, this is the point at
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which Palestinians expected statehood.33
Initial Palestinian expectations were high as is reflected in Arafat’s lofty
rhetoric at the start of the process. At the signing ceremony of the Declaration of
Principles (Oslo I) on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993, Arafat
expressed Palestinian hopes: “My people are hoping that this agreement which
we are signing today marks the beginning of the end of a chapter of pain and suf-
fering which has lasted throughout this century . . . [and that it] will usher in an
age of peace, coexistence and equal rights.”34 Two years later at the signing of
the Oslo II agreement, Arafat continued this message: “A significant portion of
Palestinian national rights reverts today to the Palestinian people through their
control of the cities, villages and populated areas.” He added: “We urge you all
to recognize the importance of this historic interim step that demonstrates [that]
. . . the Israeli and Palestinian peoples would coexist on the basis of mutual
recognition of the rights, while enjoying equality and self-determination without
occupation or repeated wars and without terrorism.”35
What did the Oslo process change? First, it ended the day-to-day policing
of most Palestinians by Israeli soldiers. Second, it gave the Palestinian Authority
control over civilian agencies, though many were still at the mercy of Israeli
decisions as I explain below. Third, the Oslo II agreement (28 September 1995)
divided the land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip into three areas: Area A with
full Palestinian responsibility for civilian and security affairs; Area B with
Palestinian civil responsibility and Israeli security responsibility; and Area C
under full Israeli control. By mid-2000, the West Bank was divided into A (about
17 percent), B (24 percent), and C (59 percent). The land under Palestinian con-
trol (A and B) was often not contiguous, and a map of the West Bank looked
more like a Rorschach test. 
Despite these changes, Israel’s power over Palestinian life remained dom-
inant.36 Israeli settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem was not
explicitly forbidden by the Oslo agreements, and the construction of new settle-
ments and the expansion of old ones continued.37 From 1993 to 2000, the num-
ber of Israeli settlers increased by at least 117 percent in Gaza and at least 46 per-
cent in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem).38 In 2000, seven years after
Oslo I, Israel still fully controlled East Jerusalem, 20 percent of Gaza land, and
about 59 percent of the West Bank land (Area C). In another 24 percent of the
West Bank, Israel still retained security control (Area B). Much taxation and rev-
enue still went through Israeli coffers, and Israel decided when to hand over such
money to the Palestinian Authority. A customs union meant that Palestinians had
to pay Israeli prices for major consumer items and other goods. As more Israelis
moved to Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, Israel also implemented a policy
of revoking permission to live in Jerusalem from Palestinians who could not
prove the center of their life was in Jerusalem; over 1,600 Palestinians and their
families were removed in this way from 1996-98, according to Israeli officials.39
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Israeli land expropriation of Arab land and Israeli demolition of Palestinian
houses, aspects of the Israeli occupation since 1967, continued under Oslo.
Approximately 670 Palestinian homes in the West Bank (including Jerusalem)
were destroyed from September 1993 to June 1998. In the first two years after
the signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel confiscated 41,000 acres of
West Bank land. In 1999, Israel took another 10,000 acres of land in the West
Bank.40 The loss of land decreased the contiguity of Palestinian towns and vil-
lages, inhibited natural Palestinian growth patterns, and undermined Palestinian
agricultural efforts in some areas. 
One of Israel’s most powerful tools was full control of borders including
international borders with Jordan and Egypt, borders with Israel itself including
occupied East Jerusalem, linkage between Gaza and the West Bank, and internal
borders between Palestinian cities and towns. Israel frequently closed any and all
of these borders thereby disrupting  travel, trade, taxation, postal services, bank-
ing, medical, and educational activities. A safe passage route was supposed to be
agreed upon to allow easy Palestinian travel and movement of goods between
Gaza and the West Bank but the talks dragged on for years; a “southern” Gaza-
West Bank route opened in late 1999.41 For close to a decade, Palestinians have
needed to secure travel permits, for instance, to travel from Gaza to the West
Bank or to enter East Jerusalem. Particularly as Israel continued turning over
control of villages and cities – but often not the land connecting them to other
Palestinian locales – to the Palestinian Authority, Israel could cut off individual
villages and cities. The Palestinian economy and nascent efforts to develop trade
and foreign investment were particularly vulnerable to the multi-level Israeli bor-
der control. 
Settlement building and land transfers to the Palestinian Authority also led
to the proliferation of bypass roads in the West Bank. Bypass roads were built for
Israeli drivers who were often heading to and from Israeli settlements and skirt-
ed Palestinian cities and villages. While designed to reduce contact between
Israelis and Palestinians and thereby prevent attacks against Israeli cars, the
roads also further cut the West Bank into pieces. This further limited the possi-
bility of finding a political resolution in which the Palestinians ended up with a
state composed of contiguous territory.  In some places, Israel destroyed
Palestinian buildings or orchards to clear a wide swath of land for a bypass road
and a security strip alongside the road.42
Israel justified most measures on security grounds and lamented the hos-
tile rhetoric of the PA and its leaders. Israeli leaders decried the militant opposi-
tion to the Oslo process, complained of faulty implementation on the part of the
PA, and regularly called for more arrests and more general effort on the part of
Palestinian security forces to rein in Palestinian terrorists. 
Israel’s position, however, also became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The psy-
chological impact of prolonged repression and subjugation as well as the denial
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of political rights and non-violent means of political action set the stage for more
violence. Stringent security measures, frequent closures that brought daily life to
a standstill, expropriation of land, and other anti-democratic tendencies created
and strengthened deep-seated animosity toward Israel and Israelis that then, in
part, fueled militant movements and skepticism of the diplomatic route.
Furthermore, some measures went beyond security and lasted longer than Israel’s
security needs required.43 This suggests other factors that influenced Israeli deci-
sion-making, such as a belief in the efficacy of collective punishment and the
desire to gain irrevocable control of key areas of land and settlement.44
Continued Israeli control of Palestinian life led to resentment that boiled
just below the surface for several years. Palestinians saw the peace process as a
failure, a “sham.”45 Critics of the Oslo process regularly pointed to this repres-
sion and discontent as proof that the Palestinians were being shortchanged by the
Oslo process.46 Even after the Israeli redeployments from 1994 onward, Israeli
forces were just over the horizon and operated behind the scenes. Palestinian
bureaucrats often did little more than convey paperwork and requests from
Palestinians to Israeli authorities; the Israelis would make the decisions. 
This perception that the peace process had not met Palestinian expectations
set the stage for the second intifada. According to Muhammad Dahlan, a leading
Palestinian security official, the intifada “did not occur because of planning or ill
intentions but due to Palestinian desperation after seven years without arriving at
a final agreement . . ..  The intifada happened because of the loss of hope in the
peace process.”47 Robert Fisk, a British journalist who has long covered the
region, argued that, “[s]heer despair at the perceived injustice of the Oslo agree-
ment . . . simply overwhelmed the clichés about the ‘peace process’ and the need
to put Oslo ‘back on track.’”48 Amira Hass, an Israeli journalist, claimed that,
“The intifada broke out because the Palestinian public was tired of this situation
of occupation that adopts other names.”49 In short, the ground was fertile for a
renewed clash. Palestinians still felt the heavy hand of Israel in the suppression
of Palestinian national rights. 
Some Israeli officials were aware that the situation was explosive. Major
General Yaakov Or, coordinator of Israeli government activities in the territories,
warned Barak “several times that without real progress in the talks with the
Palestinians, an explosion [in the territories] could be expected.”50 On 26
September 2000, two days before Sharon’s visit, “senior military intelligence and
assessment officers attached to all of Israel’s various security agencies, arrived at
the conclusion that the head of the Palestinian preventive security agency, Jibril
Rajoub, was not issuing empty threats. The officers concluded that Sharon’s visit
to the Temple Mount would ignite the flames of violence” and Arafat would then
exploit the opportunity.51
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Military Preparations
Perhaps the most important but least understood part of the story of the
outbreak of the intifada is the way in which military preparations starting in the
mid-1990s fueled the drive toward violence. The Israeli-Palestinian interactions
created a classic spiral of insecurity in which both sides saw the other as aggres-
sive and themselves and their own moves as only reactive. Furthermore, each
side assumed that its adversary was motivated by external factors when domes-
tic ones often played as important a role.
Israel
In many ways, the Israeli-Palestinian spiral started on the night of 23-24
September 1996, when Benjamin Netanyahu authorized the opening of one
access point to a passage along the Western Wall. Palestinians protested on 24
September, and the “tunnel” protests intensified the next day. The casualty num-
bers climbed and the confrontation spread throughout the West Bank. In total,
almost 100 Israelis and Palestinians died.52
Based on these confrontations, Israel decided it needed to plan to use mas-
sive force to quell Palestinian unrest. Major General Gabi Ofir, then outgoing
commander of the Judea and Samaria [West Bank] Division, explained: “If the
Palestinians conduct battles like that [1996 tunnel riots], we will have to respond
much more harshly and painfully. I am not talking about notions of vengeance,
but it will be an answer that the Palestinians will have to think very hard from
the beginning if it makes sense for them to continue down this path, or if it is
preferable for them to control their forces.”53 The massive use of force might
deter, or if that failed, compel an end to the violence: “IDF planners were con-
vinced that a real show of strength immediately following the outbreak of vio-
lence would make the rioters understand the heavy price they would have to pay
for the continued violence, and that would cool their ardor at once.”54 Israel “was
aspiring to rehabilitate its lost deterrence powers.”55
When the second intifada erupted, the Israeli military followed its plan.
According to an Israeli columnist, on the “second day of the [second] intifada,
an angry [Mohammad] Dahlan phoned [then Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul] Mofaz.
“How come we have 100 dead and you have none?” he asked. Mofaz took it as
a compliment.”56 In other words, the Israeli plan was working.
Israeli preparations were further spurred on by Palestinian threats.
Palestinian measures confirmed the fear of the Israeli military leaders that the
Palestinians were preparing for war.57 In 1997, for instance, the Israeli Defense
Minister warned members of the Israeli parliament that “there is a desire by
Palestinian Authority people, and definitely by violent elements on the ground,
to ignite the area, bring about confrontation and bloodshed, and an escalation.”
He went on to explain that Israel was ready to respond.58
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Thus, Israeli planners highlighted two objectives: deterring Palestinian
violence and compelling the Palestinians to stop fighting if deterrence failed.
Outsiders mentioned a third possibility: compelling Palestinian acceptance of
Israel’s diplomatic aims. The perception was that Israel believed the use of force
would compel the Palestinians to accept Israel’s “terms and conditions” at the
bargaining table: “to impose by force of arms what Israel tried to achieve by
force of negotiation at the Camp David summit.”59 The Palestinians could either
accept the deal Israel offered or face being crushed by the IDF.  
At the practical level, the Israeli military planned for the most far-reaching
operation short of expulsion, the re-taking of Palestinian cities. The plan was
known as OPERATION FIELD OF THORNS.60 Israel acknowledged the exis-
tence of a plan as early as June 1997.61 Sometime between May and September
2000, Barak “approved the operational and tactical plans of the IDF to halt the
intifada.”62 One alternate possibility is that Barak favored a more gradual
response, but the IDF planned for a harsh response: “Instead of taking pinpoint-
ed moves, moving gradually, collecting a price systematically, and letting the
Palestinians understand that they would pay more every time violence escalates,
the army slammed all across the sector.”63
Israel prepared to use tanks and helicopters to “crush” the Palestinians and
re-take land in Area A.64 The plans also called for an economic blockade and
arresting PA officials.65 In the four years prior to the intifada, Israel held military
exercises to practice the operation.66 On 13 April 2000, for instance, an Israeli
media outlet reported that “the IDF has recently conducted extensive military
exercises simulating armed conflict with Palestinians.”67 The Israeli Chief of
Staff, Mofaz, spoke to Israeli soldiers in June 2000 about plans for controlling
Palestinian unrest: “If tanks are needed, tanks will be brought in, and if attack
helicopters are necessary, attack helicopters will be brought in.”68 Israel pre-
pared special army units for assassinations.69
In addition to IDF preparations, Israeli settlers in the West Bank were also
arming. They acquired a range of military equipment: “Telescopic sights, night-
vision equipment, four wheel drive vehicles, tactical combat gear, spare parts,
and rescue and medical equipment are only some of the equipment being pur-
chased with the donations collected abroad.” The equipment was purchased in
“full coordination” with the IDF.70
Not only did the Israel government have a plan, but it also publicly warned
the Palestinians that renewed violence would be met harshly. On 26 July 2000,
at the conclusion of the failed Camp David summit, Barak hinted at the alterna-
tives: “To our neighbors, the Palestinians, I say today: We do not seek conflict.
But if any of you should dare to put us to the test, we will stand together, strong
and determined, convinced in the justness of our cause in the face of any chal-
lenge, and we shall triumph.”71 Israel’s general position was the same: “Some
Palestinian circles have intimated and even declared that they intend to resort to
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violence should the Camp David Summit fail. There is not justification for such
a reaction, and Israel will do everything within its authority to maintain calm and
prevent violence.”72 According to General Tawfiq Tirawi, the head of Palestinian
General Intelligence in the West Bank, “Both [the commander of the West Bank,
Brigadier General Shlomo] Oren and Mofaz threatened to bomb us before every-
thing began.”73
One alternative to the IDF’s approach was a plan drawn up by the Peace
Administration, an organization outside the IDF formed during Barak’s govern-
ment. The Peace Administration’s “grid” plan aimed to contain fighting in iso-
lated pockets while allowing Palestinian life to continue in other pockets. The
plan sought to avoid both “smashing everything to pieces” and escalation.74
Palestinians
As Israel was planning and practicing, so too were many on the Palestinian
side. Three factors motivated Palestinian military preparations, especially among
leaders and factions associated with Fatah and the nationalist Palestinian move-
ment. These factors included the internal struggle for leadership and power with-
in Palestinian society; the response to Israeli preparations; and the belief that
threatening the use of force would improve the Palestinian bargaining position
and make a two-state solution more likely. 
Palestinian society has often been depicted as split between nationalist
forces typified by Arafat, the PA, the PLO, and Fatah, and Islamist forces typi-
fied by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.75 Such a dichotomy, however, misses the inter-
nal splits within the nationalist movement that are central to understanding the
outbreak of the intifada. Arafat and members of the old guard who moved with
him from Tunis to Gaza and the West Bank in 1994 held the reins of power in the
Palestinian Authority. These “outsider” politicians ran the negotiations with
Israel and were dubbed the “luxury hotel activists” by one analyst.76 They faced,
however, a challenge internal to their movement from the younger generation
who helped lead the first intifada that started in December 1987.
The young guard, largely composed of the Fatah cadres, chafed under the
rule of the old leadership.  The younger generation or insiders dominated the
security organizations like the Tanzim and the Preventive Security Force in the
West Bank.77 The most important leader was Marwan Barghouti, the central
player in the growth of the Tanzim and the young guard. From 1994-99, about
2,500 new local leaders were elected to various committees within Fatah. The
goal, which remains unfulfilled, was to take control of the leading Fatah
organs.78
The old/young split itself also obscures important distinctions and inter-
relationships. The PA’s effort to co-opt the young guard with government
employment and the young guard’s efforts to take over Fatah meant the two were
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inter-mingled. One analyst concisely captured the tension: “For, on the one hand,
the tanzim provides the military and political base of the PA’s rule. On the other,
they are its loyal – and yet potentially most seditious – opposition.”79 Moreover,
within the young guard there were political leaders striving for control of Fatah
and, ultimately, Palestinian “state” institutions, and militants directly fighting
with Israel including Fatah offshoots (e.g. the al-Aqsa Brigades).80 After the start
of the intifada, the same Palestinian fighter might be a member of the Tanzim, a
PA security or intelligence service, and the newly-minted al-Aqsa brigades. 
Why did factionalism promote militarization and arming? In the absence
of democratic governance for Palestinians, being armed was the major currency
of political power. One’s ability to defend one’s political strength turned, in part,
on one’s ability to show or use force. Furthermore, in the contest for the support
of the Palestinian public, the commitment to the use of force was the default
position. If a faction rejected this approach, they risked looking like an
American-Israeli accomplice and thereby losing support. For some aspiring lead-
ers, “their prestige, status, and popularity, relies on their image as fighters for
freedom and against corruption.”81 This was especially a problem in the face of
repeated Islamist charges that the PA, Fatah, and the nationalist camp had sold
out and were no longer true to the goals of ending the occupation and destroying
Israel.
The main political dividing lines between the old and young guards were
over corruption in the PA, exclusion from the decision-making process, and the
diplomatic approach to Israel (in short, “misgovernment” and “defeatism”).82
Members of the Tanzim sometimes acted as opponents of Arafat’s regime,
whether at the street-level or as members of the Palestinian Legislative
Council.83 On Israel, the young guard felt that diplomacy alone would not end
the occupation; only when coupled with the threat of force would Israel make
diplomatic concessions and allow a legitimate two-state solution to emerge.
One manifestation of the inward emphasis of Palestinian militarization was
the numerous intra-Palestinian clashes that occurred in the late 1990s and into
2000. The most striking aspect of the clashes is that many took place within the
nationalist (Fatah) camp rather than across the nationalist-Islamist divide. Ami
Ayalon, head of Israel’s Shin Bet under Barak, was fearful of violence but pre-
dicted that an intifada could be directed against the PA or Israel.84 In 2000, prior
to the intifada, there were dozens of violent outbursts, including clashes between
Palestinian police and opposition forces in Ramallah and Beit Jala.85 On 22
March 2000, Pope John Paul II’s visit to a refugee camp near Bethlehem ended
with a battle between PA police and members of the camp committee (drawn
from Fatah and the Popular Front). Palestinian sources tried to block media cov-
erage of such fights.86
A central issue around which Palestinian disagreements crystallized was
Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. Much of the Palestinian public believed
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that the release of such prisoners proceeded too slowly during the Oslo years. As
a result, this often pitted the leadership of the PA who negotiated with Israel for
the release of prisoners against other grassroots Fatah elements. The latter
charged that the PA was not doing enough. By 1998-2000, prisoner hunger
strikes and solidarity protests were not uncommon. 
In May 2000, serious violence erupted. On 1 May, hundreds of Palestinian
political inmates in Israeli jails began a hunger strike led by members of Fatah.
On 10 May, protests in the occupied territories in support of the hunger strikers
“began in earnest.” On 15 May, the anniversary of al-Nakba, “the violence esca-
lated dramatically.” IDF and Palestinian police forces clashed, and Fatah mem-
bers were again at the forefront of the protests. According to one analyst, Arafat
(and the PA leadership) was in the position “where he has little alternative but to
go along with the popular mood.” Arafat might also have hoped to improve his
bargaining position by demonstrating that he, like Barak, could not ignore his
domestic constituents.87 By the end of the protests, eight Palestinians had been
killed.88
The second major factor that explains Palestinian militarization was Israeli
policies. Palestinians assumed that Israel’s contingency planning was a signal of
Israel’s desire to re-take the Palestinian cities. In mid-1997, Jibril Rajoub, then
head of the Preventive Security Force in the West Bank, responded to reports that
Israel had simulated re-taking Area A of the West Bank by saying, “if your
extremists try to conquer the territories in which we are now, I am sure you will
not be received with rice or roses but by a more suitable action on our part.”89 In
late 1999, “the Palestinian leadership [was] convinced that, should negotiations
fail, the Israelis could decide to reconquer the autonomous territories. They are
preparing for such an event, and Shin Bet is receiving more and more informa-
tion on arms smuggling, forbidden by the accords, especially in Gaza.”90 In this
context, Arafat’s remarks on 25 June 2000 to thousands of Fatah supporters in
Nablus was seen as a reaction to Mofaz’s warning that Israel would use tanks and
helicopters to stop unrest if the process fell apart. One can imagine how Israelis
heard Arafat’s words: “Our people will not be scared, not by tanks, not by air-
craft, and we remind those who doubt our resolve of the battle of Karama and the
[first] Intifada.”91
On 29 June 2000, Israeli political and military leaders met to discuss
Israel’s response to the possibility of a unilateral Palestinian declaration of inde-
pendence. Among other points, they discussed OPERATION FIELD OF
THORNS. When Arafat learned of this meeting, it confirmed Palestinian fears
that Israel was thinking of re-taking even Area A of the West Bank.92 In reaction
to Sharon’s planned visit, Fatah organized “scores of Fatah youth to come to the
Temple Mount ‘to protect the site.’”93
The third major factor for explaining Palestinian military preparations was
the growing belief among the young guard that threatening the use of force was
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the only way to get Israel to end the occupation and embrace a genuine two-state
solution. The young guard bought into an ideology that said threatening the use
of force would move the diplomatic effort; in a repudiation of what was seen as
the failed logic of Oslo, the use of force was necessary and legitimate. “The only
thing the Israelis understand is force,” said Barghouti. For instance, the tunnel
riots led to an Israeli withdrawal from part of Hebron.94 After the outbreak of the
second intifada, Barghouti explained:
How would you feel if on every hill in territory that belongs to you
a new settlement would spring up? If your best friends, with whom
you fought shoulder to shoulder, continue to rot in jail? I reached a
simple conclusion. You [Israel] don’t want to end the occupation and
you don’t want to stop the settlements, so the only way to convince
you is by force. This is the Intifada of peace.95
This tendency to believe in the efficacy of force was reinforced for some
Palestinians when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Hizbollah’s military
campaign succeeded in sending the occupier home and was worthy of emulation
in the territories, they argued.96
Among the negotiators, Abu Ala warned Uri Savir that the Israeli with-
drawal from Lebanon would be interpreted to mean that the use of force would
lead Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines. Mofaz, later warned Mohammed
Dahlan, a senior Palestinian security official, not to draw such a conclusion.97
Some of the Palestinian warnings prior to Sharon’s visit to the Temple
Mount/Noble Sanctuary may be seen in a similar light. Rajoub and Barghouti, for
instance, predicted that if riots erupted they would spread to the West Bank and
Gaza Strip and turn violent.98 Such comments may have been intended to esca-
late the potential stakes and thereby deter Sharon or compel the Israeli govern-
ment to stop the visit. In short, they highlight the possibility of violence so as to
avoid violence and promote diplomacy. Yet Israelis may have read such com-
ments as inflammatory rather than as an effort to avoid confrontation. 
The result of the internal struggle for power, responses to Israeli prepara-
tions, and belief in the efficacy of force was Palestinian militarization.
Palestinian organizations were arming and organizing for military action.
Various organizations sought arms and stockpiled food.99 Most importantly,
Fatah built and strengthened the Tanzim, a street-level militia composed of fight-
ers from the younger generation. The Tanzim later played a central role on the
Palestinian side in the early days of the intifada.
Implications 
The military steps each side took reinforced the belief on the other side that
the adversary wanted violence. The signal one intends to send may be very dif-
ferent from the one that is received. More generally, this case illuminates the
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operation of a classic spiral of insecurity and two factors that might exacerbate
the spiral, namely misperceptions about the relative importance of domestic and
external factors for understanding one’s adversary, and the linkage of diplomacy
to the threat to use force.
The preparations undertaken by both sides spurred an escalatory spiral that
contributed to the outbreak of the second intifada. For both parties, the other’s
military preparations had the two effects predicted by Robert Jervis – they were
“doubly insecure.” By arming and organizing, the other party had demonstrated
both “an increased ability to do harm” and that it was “actively contemplating
hostile actions.”100 Both the IDF and the young guard thought in terms of deter-
rence and compellence; a show of strength would dissuade the adversary. In
truth, it had the opposite impact by further ratcheting up tensions and causing
more military preparations: “attempts to increase one’s security by standing firm
and accumulating more arms will be self-defeating.”101
Unintended spirals of insecurity may be even more likely given existing
hatred, fear, and mistrust. These poor relationships between (one-time) adver-
saries may intersect with an accidental spark. In general, but similar to the sec-
ond intifada, “accidents and incidents by soldiers not completely under control
of their faction leaders, or by civilians who have been polarized by war can also
escalate and drag the country back toward war.”102
Two other factors helped fuel the spiral. Actors may misunderstand the bal-
ance between domestic and external motivations for policy. Rather than an
intense factional struggle, Israel saw Palestinian militarization as a PA policy
aimed at Israel. What the Tanzim did was seen as part of the PA and Arafat’s
Fatah rather than as a challenge to Arafat and the PA. Klein said there was “total
blindness” in Israel to the reality of this Palestinian factionalism.103 Israel mis-
takenly saw the Palestinians as a unitary actor. Israel’s reading of Palestinian
action, in turn, fed the escalatory spiral of military preparations.
The final implication is a reminder of the risks of a policy that links diplo-
macy with the threat to use force. Some Palestinians implicitly followed Carl von
Clausewitz’s famous dictum: “War is the continuation of politics by other
means.”104 Threats to use force, however, may undermine diplomacy, as was the
case here. Israel probably saw the Palestinian threat of violence as an alternative
to diplomacy; they did not see the two as inter-related. In other words, Israel
probably assumed the Palestinian militants preferred to resort to force rather than
an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines. 
Camp David Failure
The failure to reach a final agreement at the Camp David summit in July
2000 also contributed to the perception on both sides that the parties were head-
ed down a military path. For Israelis, Arafat spurned a generous Israeli offer
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because the Palestinians wanted a military, not a diplomatic, solution. For
Palestinians, the many limitations of Israel’s offer at Camp David reinforced the
belief that Israel was using the final status talks to make the occupation perma-
nent. Neither portrayal was accurate, yet taken together they created the wide-
spread but false perception that the diplomatic route had been exhausted.105
After Camp David, many Israelis argued that the failure showed the
Palestinians were not serious about a negotiated settlement as can be seen in
Barak’s critique of Arafat. As Barak later wrote, “At Camp David, Mr. Arafat
well understood that the moment of truth had come and that painful decisions
needed to be made by both sides. He failed this challenge.”106 Barak saw “[t]hat
at the deepest level Arafat does not accept the moral and juridical right of the
State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state.  That . . . Arafat’s obsession is not to
establish Palestinian sovereignty in part of the land but ‘to correct the injustice
of 1948’ – in other words, to destroy the State of Israel.”107 Though such per-
spectives began to crystallize after Camp David, the outbreak of the intifada was
taken as strong confirmation that the Palestinians did not want – and had never
wanted - the negotiations to succeed.
Palestinians, too, learned from Camp David but they contended that the
shortcomings of Israel’s offer proved Israel wanted to continue the occupation.
Israel’s diplomacy was merely a facade. Israel wanted to keep control of some
Arab areas of East Jerusalem, keep a sizable percentage of the land of the West
Bank, and agree upon a host of intrusive security measures, all of which would
have allowed Israel to maintain control of Palestinian life.108 In short, talks
would not end the occupation or bring about independence. Thus, to some
Palestinians, a different route, a military one, was the only way to get Israel to
leave.109
More generally, the failure of Camp David suggests the great risks associ-
ated with high-level diplomacy. To the extent that failed negotiations signal to
each side that the diplomatic route is dead, they may make the military option
seem more attractive.
The Israeli and Palestinian Responses to the First Signs of Protest
Once the protests started on 28-29 September, the initial responses by mul-
tiple parties greatly worsened the situation. The harsh Israeli response, based on
the IDF’s belief that overwhelming force would contain the protests, escalated
rather than calmed the situation. Tanzim and Palestinian militants saw the initial
confrontations as the opportunity they had been waiting for to confront and pres-
sure Israel. Arafat and top Palestinian leaders failed to rein in the militants. But
these dynamics also were inter-related. As the number of dead Palestinians
quickly climbed, the ability of any Palestinian leader to press for moderation
became more limited.110
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As both the IDF and the Tanzim followed their game plans, the confronta-
tions became a self-fulfilling prophecy. They treated the initial clashes and
protests as if this confrontation was what they had been preparing for and, in part
as a result, it became what they had been planning for, a massive Israeli-
Palestinian clash. As the Mitchell report noted, the most significant elements
were “the decision of the Israeli police on 29 September to use lethal means
against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above,
of either party to exercise restraint.”111
Israel responded to the initial protests with a heavy hand, incorrectly
believing that such an approach would calm the situation. The IDF, as had been
planned, made extensive use of snipers, even in the absence of Palestinian gun-
fire. Sniper squads were reinforced following the 1996 riots, and in 2000 they
played “a central role in the fighting.”112 According to the IDF, Israeli forces
fired one million rounds in the first three weeks of the intifada, “a bullet for every
child” according to one Israeli officer.113 In the first five days of fighting, Israeli
forces killed 50 Palestinians and wounded more than 1,000.114 Palestinian doc-
tors said the nature of the injuries suggested an Israeli shoot-to-kill policy. Most
injuries were to the upper body (head, chest, abdomen), and only 20 percent of
those injured in the first three days were discharged on that day.115 Israel’s dis-
proportionate use of force was quickly noted by human rights organizations, and
Dennis Ross expressed US concerns to Barak.116
The IDF’s emphasis on force backfired and led to further escalation:
“Contrary to the expectations of the IDF planners, the hard blows that had been
dealt the Palestinians did not subdue them. Instead, the Israeli response led to an
escalation of violence as the Palestinians became increasingly angry at the strikes
directed at them.”117 Observers of specific Israeli-Palestinian confrontations in
the first weeks of fighting described the causal link: “[T]he policy employed is
crucial. The greater the force used by [Israeli] soldiers and the more people killed
and wounded, the longer and more violent the demonstration.”118 The rising
Palestinian death toll spurred Palestinian fighters to want to even the score by
evening out “the blood balance,” the casualty numbers on each side.119
The intensity of the Israeli response was the result of Israeli generals who
disregarded the will of politicians to take a softer approach. This divide may have
broader implications for civil-military relations in a democracy engaged in a
long-running conflict. Israeli military leaders blocked political efforts to de-esca-
late the conflict. The IDF, for instance, refused to carry out orders from the polit-
ical side after the summit at Arab-Israeli summit at Sharm el-Sheikh in October
2000.120 Israel’s deputy minister of defense, Efraim Sneh, warned Barak, who
held the defense portfolio along with being prime minister: “From the chief of
staff down to the last sergeant at the roadblock, no one is implementing your pol-
icy.”121 When Barak officials pushed for a more restrained response along the
lines of the Peace Administration’s grid plan, the IDF dragged its feet and
Fall 2003
132
blocked it both at the start of the intifada and when the Peace Administration
made a second push in October 2000. Israeli generals frequently pressed Barak
to take a harder line.122 For one Israeli journalist, Israeli policy-making during
the intifada proved the army dominates the state and not vice-versa.123
On the Palestinian side, street-level militants, such as members of the
Tanzim, saw the outbreak of protest as an opportunity to confront Israel and pres-
sure the Jewish state to end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Marwan
Barghouti was disappointed with the initial results but persisted in seeking
greater Tanzim involvement. Israeli leaders were convinced that members of the
Tanzim were playing a key role in fueling the Palestinian protests.124
Arafat did not launch the intifada, but once the protests erupted he believed
the Palestinians could improve their position by allowing the violence to flare
rather than trying to immediately bring the conflict to an end. He was ready to
“ride the storm” for several weeks.125 The Mitchell committee found that there is
“no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to con-
tain the demonstrators and control the violence once it began.”126 Though one
Palestinian analyst described Arafat’s policy as studied non-interference, his role
was not totally passive. The decision to travel outside the territories for several
of the early days of fighting, allegations that he met with and encouraged Tanzim
leaders on 29 September 2000, and the release of some Hamas prisoners fall
more on the active than passive side of the ledger.127 As an Israeli major general
claimed, “Arafat’s unwillingness to intervene is tantamount to giving license to
Tanzim operatives to continue to run amok.”128
Past research on organizational behavior also informs assessments of IDF
and Tanzim policies. Organizations tend to act based on “preestablished rou-
tines.” Organizations lack, however, much flexibility: “programs cannot be sub-
stantially changed in a particular situation” even if they are ill-suited to the
emerging situation.129 Even if IDF leaders, for instance, had recognized the esca-
latory spiral in which they were engaged, they might not have been able to rap-
idly modify the organizational mechanisms that had led them to that point.
Furthermore, the very commitment to the heavy use of force to crush Palestinian
protest may have blinded them to the possibility that it was not working and to
the idea that Israel had other options. 
CONCLUSION
The second intifada was not caused by Yasser Arafat or Ariel Sharon,
though both played a role in it outbreak. Sharon’s visit to the Temple
Mount/Nobel Sanctuary was a trigger that set events in motion. Arafat’s refusal
to attempt to restrain Palestinian militants helped allow events spin out of con-
trol.
To focus only on Arafat and Sharon, however, misses the more important
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elements. The deepening of the Israeli occupation during the Oslo years, in con-
trast with Palestinian expectations for greater political freedom and economic
gains, led to popular discontent. By the late 1990s, both the IDF and Palestinian
factions were engaged in military planning and preparation that helped set the
stage for a clash. Once the protests began, Israel’s heavy-handed response and
the Palestinian leadership’s unwillingness to rein in militants resulted in a rapid
escalation and high Palestinian casualties.
Many Israeli and Palestinian officials thought that by looking strong and
responding harshly to the other side, they could deter violence and compel sub-
mission. Instead, efforts to deter and compel led to more violence and a renewed
commitment by both sides not to back down. The thousands of dead since that
time are a testament to the failure of such an approach.
The intifada was not a fundamental rejection of the diplomatic route for
important factions on both sides. Some actors saw this confrontation as a way to
strengthen their hand at the bargaining table. Moreover, while the confrontation
was not wholly unintended, the pathway it took was not what most parties
expected.
With the resumption of high level diplomatic talks, leaders will need to
pay careful attention to signaling and perceptions. They may be taking certain
military steps even as the diplomats negotiate. To avoid another spiral of insecu-
rity, leaders will either need to minimize such military measures or fully, clearly,
and convincingly explain their motivations to the other side. Third party engage-
ment may prove crucial to this effort.
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